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GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES, ) 
a Partnership, ) 
Plaintiff, Respondent ) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
and Cross-Appellant, ) AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 20514 
GLAD RAGS, INC., ) 
Defendant and Appellant, ) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. There is substantial evidence in the record on 
appeal to support the finding of the trial court that Glad Rags 
breached the lease agreement by abandoning the premises. 
2. The trial court acted correctly in refusing to find 
that Glad Rags was entitled to an interest in the lease 
payments of the replacement tenants. 
3. The finding of the trial court that Glad Rags 
abandoned the leasehold has substantial support in the record. 
4. The trial record contains substantial support for 
the finding that Fashion Place acted reasonably to mitigage 
damages caused by Glad Rags' breach of the lease. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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5. The judgment of the lower court is inconsistent 
with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
6. The finding of the trial court that Glad Rags 
abandoned any personal property left in the leasehold is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
7. Fashion Place will return Glad Rags' security 
deposit upon satisfaction of the judgment awarded herein. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
78-36-12.3 Definitions. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the 
following situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner 
that he or she will be absent from the premises, 
and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days 
after the due date, and there is no reasonable 
evidence other than the presence of the tenant's 
personal property that the tenant is occupying 
the premises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner 
that he or she will be absent from the premises, 
and the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant's personal property has been removed from 
the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable 
evidence that the tenant is occupying the 
premises. 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises - retaking and 
rerenting by owner - liability of tenant-
personal property of tenant left on premises. In 
the event of abandonment the owner may: 
(1) Retake the premises and attempt to rent them 
at fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned 
the premises shall be liable: 
(a) For the entire rent due for the 
remainder of the term; 
(b) For rent accrued during the period 
necessary to re-rent the premises at a fair 
rental value, plus the difference between the 
fair rental value and the rent agreed to in the 
prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable 
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commission for the renting of the premises and 
the costs, if any, necessary to restore the 
rental unit to its condition when rented by the 
tenant less normal wear and tear. This 
subsection shall apply, if less than subsection 
(a) notwithstanding that the owner did not 
re-rent the premises. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Fashion Place Associates, Plaintiff, Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant (hereinafter "Fashion Place") as Lessor sought 
recovery of damages it sustained as a result of a breach of a 
written lease agreement by Lessee, Glad Rags, Inc., 
(hereinafter "Glad Rags"). 
The Honorable David B. Dee, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, sitting as 
trier-of-fact, found in favor of Fashion Place. 
However, the trial court judgment awarding Fashion 
Place damages in the amount of $12,233.00 is inconsistent with 
the lower court's finding that the accrued lease charges 
actually totalled $24,467.87. 
On Cross-appeal, Fashion Place requests that this 
action be remanded to the lower court with the direction that 
the inconsistency be cured by an appropriate modification of 
the judgment. 
With that exception, Fashion Place asks that the 
judgment of the trial court be sustained, and that in 
addition Fashion Place be awarded attorney's fees incurred in 
this appeal. 
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Statutory citations herein are to the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended unless otherwise indicated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 10, 1974, Fashion Place by written agreement 
leased to Glad Rags certain commercial space in the Fashion 
Place Mall, located in Salt Lake County. (Exhibit 1; R. 317, 
491). The term of the lease was 15 years (Exhibit 1; R. 6). 
Marie Smith, President of Glad Rags, read the lease and 
had it reviewed by her own counsel prior to signing it. (R. 
492). The portions of the lease agreement relevant to the 
issues raised on appeal are set out in full in the appendix to 
this brief. 
Glad Rags operated a women's clothing store at the 
Fashion Place Mall from 1974 through December 31, 1981. (R. 
492). On December 31, 1981, the fifteen year term of the lease 
still had eight years to run. (Exhibit 1? R. 6). 
By 1981, the Glad Rags store at Fashion Place Mall was 
operating at a marginal level. (R. 492, 493). As early as 
1980, Glad Rags had signed a written memorandum agreeing to 
terminate the lease if Fashion Place would pay Glad Rags 
$50,000.00. (Exhibit 4; R. 338). According to that memorandum 
Fashion Place would try to locate a prospective tenant who 
would be willing to pay that sura for the priviledge of entering 
into a new lease with Fashion Place for the space Glad Rags 
wanted to vacate. (R. 334, 338, 340, 341). 
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Subsequently, similar memoranda were signed in which 
the $50,000.00 figure was reduced. (Exhibits 5, 6). 
Between December 31, 1979 and December 31, 1981, 
Fashion Place located a prospective tenant willing to pay 
$15,000.00 to occupy the Glad Rags space. Glad Rags rejected 
that proposal. (R. 493, 494). 
In the fall of 1981, Marie Smith, President of Glad 
Rags, met with Robert Garwood, center manager of the Fashion 
Place Mall, an employee of Ernest W. Hahn Corporation, the 
managing agent of the lessor. (R. 314, 325). At that meeting 
Mrs. Smith told Garwood that Glad Rags was not doing well and 
that Glad Rags wanted to move out at the end of the year. (R. 
325). 
Mr. Garwood indicated he wanted Glad Rags to stay, and 
that if the store were closed he could not guarantee that the 
landlord would not pursue Glad Rags for the arrearages that 
would accrue after they vacated the space. (R. 325, 332). 
Mrs. Smith disputes this version of her conversation 
with Garwood. (R. 504). She states that Garwood told her there 
would be no problem with her vacating the store as of December 
31, 1981, and that she would get her security deposit back and 
would receive a written release from Fashion Place. (R. 504). 
On cross-examination, Mrs. Smith testified that there 
was no specific discussion at the meeting of responsibility for 
future lease charges. (R. 495-494). 
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There is no written release, (R. 496). Marie Smith's 
husband, who Mrs. Smith testified was present at the meeting 
with Garwood, (R. 504)/ was not called as a witness by Glad 
Rags. 
Glad Rags closed the Fashion Place store effective 
December 31/ 1981. (R. 492). No lease charges have been paid 
since that date. (R. 496)• 
After December 31f 19811 Mrs. Smith turned over the 
task of moving the personal property of Glad Rags out of the 
vacated store to her son, Jeffrey Smith (R. 496)/ an officer of 
Glad Rags/ Inc. (R. 524). Jeffrey Smith testified that in 
January of 1982/ shortly after vacating the premises, he 
provided Mr. Garwood with a key to the store and that he kept 
his own key to the space through February or March/ 1982. 
During that time Jeffrey Smith continued to move items out of 
the premises on an intermittent basis. (R. 546). 
Jeffrey Smith also testified that he asked for and 
received permission from Garwood to leave certain items of 
miscellaneous personal property in the premisesf with the hope 
of selling that property to a new tenant. (Exhibit 8; R. 539f 
540). Mr. Garwood recalled granting a request from Jeffrey 
Smith that Glad Rags be allowed to leave a counter and some 
clothes racks in the premises/ on the condition that Jeffrey 
Smith remove them upon 48 hours notice from Fashion Place. (R. 
394/ 451). 
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Mr. Garwood recalled that he gave notice to Jeffrey 
Smith that the items left behind be removed. (R.481). Jeffrey 
Smith had no such recollection. (R. 540). However, Jeffrey 
Smith testified that he never on any occassion requested the 
return of any personal property left in the premises (R. 549, 
550). 
After Glad Rags vacated the premises on December 31, 
1981, Fashion Place initiated efforts to relet the premises. 
(R. 318). Those efforts involved the central leasing 
department of Ernest W. Hahn Corporation (R. 318), and Mr. 
Garwood. (R. 319). 
The original 1974 Glad Rags lease was based on a per 
foot rate of $8.50 per square foot per year. (R. 459). In 
1982, after Glad Rags had vacated the premises, Fashion Place 
attempted to relet the premises for approximately $15.00 to 
$20.00 per square foot. (R. 471). 
Mrs. Smith testified that she knew when she closed the 
store that leases at the Fashion Place Mall were commonly going 
for approximately $17.00 per square foot. (R. 494). 
Eventually, the vacated space was actually relet to two 
separate tenants, Fleet Foot and Life Uniforms, in April of 
1983, (R. 319). 
Between December 31, 1981, the date on which Glad Rags 
vacated the premises, and April 1, 1983, when the new tenants 
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started paying rent, lease charges accrued under the original 
lease in the amount of $24,467.87. (Exhibit 2; R. 322). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. There is substantial evidence in the trial record 
to support the lower court's finding that Glad Rags breached 
the lease agreement by abandoning the premises. 
2. The trial court acted correctly in refusing to 
find that Glad Rags was entitled to an interest in the lease 
payments of the replacement tenants. 
3. The finding of the trial court that Glad Rags 
abandoned the leasehold has substantial support in the record. 
4. The trial record contains substantial support for 
the finding of that Fashion Place acted reasonably to mitigate 
damages caused by Glad Rags' breach of the lease. 
5. The judgment of the lower court is inconsistent 
with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
6. The finding of the trial court that Glad Rags 
abandoned any personal property left in the leasehold is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
7. Fashion Place will return Glad Rags' security 
deposit upon satisfaction of the judgment awarded herein. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL 
RECORD TO SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S FIND-
ING THAT GLAD RAGS BREACHED THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT BY ABANDONING THE PREMISES. 
Glad Rags contends on appeal that the finding of the 
trial court that Glad Rags abandoned the premises, thereby 
breaching the lease agreement, should be overturned. 
The lower court specifically found as a matter of fact 
tht Glad Rags breached the lease agreement by abandoning the 
premises. (Finding of Fact 2(a); R. 280; App. p. 2). 
A. Scope of Review. 
On appeal, this court must determine if findings of 
fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
Numerous Utah decisions describe the appellate court's scope of 
review as regards findings of fact adopted by the trial court. 
Those decisions are annotated at length at 3 P.D. (367 
P.2d) — 242-388. 
By way of example, this court has stated that the 
reviewing court should sustain the trial court's findings even 
if the reviewing court might have come to a different decision. 
Wash-O-Matic Inc., v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682, (Utah 1975). The 
reviewing court should defer to findings of fact rather than 
substitute its own judgment unless it can be determined as a 
matter of law that no one could reasonably find as did the fact 
finder. Carnescca v. Carnescca 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977). 
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The lower court's finding of fact should not be upset 
unless all reasonable minds would find to the contrary. 
Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977). Those 
findings must be sustained where there is competent supporting 
evidence in the trial record. Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 
526, 29 Utah 2d 370 (1973). Findings of fact will be reviewed 
in a light most favorable to the trial court and they should 
not be disturbed unless all reasonable minds would find to the 
contrary. Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977). 
Where an appellant contends that the lower court erred 
in refusing to make certain findings, that appellant is obliged 
to show that there is credible and uncontradicted evidence 
which proves the contended facts with such certainty that all 
reasonable minds must so find; conversely if there is any 
reasonable basis, either in the evidence or from lack of 
evidence, upon which reasonable minds might conclude that they 
are not so convinced by a preponderance of the evidence, then 
the findings should not be overturned. First Western Fidelity 
v. Gibbons and Reed Company 492 P.2d 132, 27 Utah 2d 1 (1971) 
Actions for breach of contract are actions at law, and 
findings should be affirmed if there is substantial evidence in 
support in the record. Flynn v. Schocker Lawn Company, 459 
P.2d 433, 23 Utah 2d 140 (1969). 
"Where there is competent evidence to support a finding 
of abandonment of contract, the Supreme Court cannot substitute 
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its judgment for that of the lower court even if it disagrees 
with the finding of the lower court." Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 
423 P.2d 491, 18 Utah 2d 368 (1967). Other Utah decisions are 
in accord. 
B. The Evidentiary Record. 
The trial record contains abundant support for the 
finding of breach by abandonment. The written lease agreement 
(Exhibit 1; R. 6) requires that the tenant make regular lease 
payments (Exhibit 1; R. 8; App. p. 12), and that the tenant 
uninterruptedly conduct and operate its business from the 
premises during the lease term. (Exhibit 1; R. 19; App. p. 
16). 
The uncontradicted testimony of Mrs. Smith, president 
of Glad Rags, Inc, is that she vacated the lease premises 
mid-term on December 31, 1981. (R. 492), and has made no lease 
payments since that date. (R. 496). 
Glad Rags has only one response to the assertion that 
its conduct breached the lease. Glad Rags claims that Robert 
Garwood, the center manager, orally waived the lease agreement. 
However, the lease agreement clearly prohibits oral waivers. 
(Exhibit 1; R. 28; App. p. 19). In addition, Mr. Garwood, the 
center manager, directly disputed Mrs. Smith's testimony. (R. 
322). 
On review, the evidence in the record strongly 
preponderates in favor of the finding that Glad Rags breached 
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the lease agreement by abandoning the premises as the trial 
court found. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN 
REFUSING TO FIND THAT GLAD RAGS WAS 
ENTITLED TO AN INTEREST IN LEASE 
PAYMENTS OF THE REPLACEMENT TENANTS. 
At trial Glad Rags contended that Fashion Place was not 
damaged by Glad Rags' breach of the lease because the leases of 
the replacement tenants, eventually found by Fashion Place, 
called for a substantial rent increase. The lower court 
rejected this argument and instead found Fashion Place was 
entitled to recover the lease arrearages that accrued between 
the breach date, December 31f 1981 and the date the replacement 
tenats started paying rent, April 1, 1983. The trial court's 
action was correct for two reasons. 
First, the evidence presented at trial was inadequate 
to support Glad Rags' claim. Second, the contention ran 
contrary to the language of the lease as well as the 
controlling statute. 
Glad Rags did not introduce any documentary evidence 
or expert testimony in support of its argument. The chart 
found on p. 20 of Appellant's Brief was not offered or 
introduced into evidence at trial. In point of fact, the only 
support found in the record are the extrapolations of counsel 
for Glad Rags based on the testimony of Mr. Garwood. (R. 
464-480). The dialogue presented in the trial transcript is 
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totally confusing as it constantly refers to blackboard 
calculations of counsel which were not made part of the trial 
record. 
More important. Glad Rags made no attempt to rebut the 
reasonable inference that Fashion Place would have leased other 
space at the mall to the replacement tenant if Glad Rags had 
not abandoned its own leasehold. The dismal factual record, on 
its own, is adequate explanation for the trial court's refusal 
to speculate in favor of Glad Rags. 
As bad as the factual record is, it is matched by an 
equal lack of legal foundation. 
First, the legal discussion presented on this point in 
Issue II of Appellant's Brief (p.18) totally ignores the 
controlling Utah statute. Section 78-12-6(1)(b) provides that 
when an abandonment occurs the abandoning tenant shall be 
liable: 
"(b)" for rent accrued during the period necessary 
to re-rent the premises at a fair rental value, plus 
the difference between the fair rental value and the 
rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a 
reasonable commission for the renting of the premises 
and the costs, if any, necessary to restore the rental 
unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less 
normal wear and tear. This subsection shall apply, if 
less than subsection (a) notwithstanding that the owner 
did not re-rent the premises. (Emphasis added). 
The statute states the mandatory measure of damages 
unambiguously. Glad Rags' suggestion that the lower court 
apply the statutory measure of recovery on a conditional basis, 
depending on an inquiry into lease terms agreed to by 
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replacement tenants, is unwarranted, and if adopted, would 
violate the clear meaning of the statute. 
Second, the mutually agreed to lease, (Exhibit 1) 
prohibits a breaching tenant from collecting rent from 
replacement tenants. The relevant part of Article 22 of the 
lease reads: 
"nor shall the Tenant hereunder have any right or 
authority to collect any rent from such tenant." 
(Exhibit 1, Article 22; R. 22; App. p. 18). 
The trial court's refusal to speculate without legal 
authority on an extremely vague factual record was both 
reasonable and proper, and that decision should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT GLAD 
RAGS ABANDONED THE LEASEHOLD HAS 
SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN THE RECORD. 
Glad Rags suggests in Issue III of its Brief on Appeal 
that the trial court erred in not finding as matter of fact an 
implied surrender and acceptance, rather than an abandonment. 
The question presented on appeal is whether the lower court's 
refusal to make such a finding is supported by the trial 
record. Stated another way, this court must determine if the 
record contains clear and uncontradicted evidence of the facts 
that would establish an implied surrender, to the degree that 
reasonable minds could not find otherwise. 
Point I of this Brief reviews the uncontradicted 
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factual record establishing an abandonment as of December 31, 
1981, the date on which Glad Rags vacated the premises. 
However, Glad Rags argues that approximately 6 months later 
that abandonment was transposed into an accepted surrender. 
The alleged causal agent of this legal alchemy was the use of 
the premises by Fashion Place for intermittent tenant meetings 
and temporary storage. 
"Abandonment" as applied to leases, involves the 
absolute relinquishment of premises by the tenant and consists 
of act or omission and intent to abandon. Tuschoff v. 
Westover, 395 P.2d 630, 665 Wash. 2d 69 (1964). The intent of 
a lessee, who has vacated the premises, to relinquish all 
rights therein can be shown by words or conduct. The question 
of abandonment is a factual one depending on all the 
surrounding circumstances and, unless reasonable men could not 
differ, the question is for the jury. Gangadean v. Erickson, 
495 P.2d 1338, 17 Ariz. App. 131 (1972). 
Both act and intention are clear in the trial record. 
In the fall of 1981, Mrs. Smith of Glad Rags told the center 
manager that she would be closing her store on December 31, 
1981. (R. 494). The store was in fact closed effective that 
date. (R. 492). At the time the store was closed, Glad Rags 
had no intention of every reoccupying the space. (R. 497). It 
was Glad Rags' understanding that after the store was closed, 
Fashion Place, "would own the space and could do whatever they 
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wanted with it." (R. 497). At no time has Glad Rags ever 
sought or asked permission to reoccupy the premises. (R. 497). 
No lease payments of any kind have been made since December 31, 
1981. (R. 496). 
By both word and deed, Glad Rags has indicated its 
clear intention to abandon the premises. 
Glad Rags having abandoned the premises. Fashion Place 
had both a contractual and a statutory right to exercise 
control over the premises. Section 78-36-12.6(1) states that 
in the event of abandonment the owner may "retake the 
premises . . . " 
Glad Rags' discussion of implied surrender completely 
ignores this statutory directive. The statutory provision, by 
permitting an owner to retake abandoned premises and to hold 
the abandoning tenant liable for rent which accrues until the 
premises can be relet, takes precedence over prior case law. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL RECORD CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL 
SUPPORT FOR THE FINDING THAT FASHION 
PLACE ACTED REASONABLY TO MITIGATE 
DAMAGES CAUSED BY GLAD RAGS' BREACH 
OF THE LEASE. 
The lower court found as a matter of fact, (Finding 3? 
R. 280, App. p. 2), and law, (Conclusion 3, R. 282; App. p. 
4) that Fashion Place made reasonable efforts to relet the 
premises at fair market value. 
The testimony of Mr. Garwood regarding the reletting 
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effort was uncontradicted. Glad Rags' criticism of the 
reletting efforts arises from the fact that Fashion Place 
sought to relet the premises for between $15.00 and $20.00*per 
square foot per year. The rental rate of the original 1974 
lease was $8.50 per square foot. Glad Rags believes that 
Fashion Place, in seeking to obtain the increased rental rate 
failed to meet its duty to mitigate. 
The lower court's finding that Fashion Place made 
reasonable efforts to mitigate should not be disturbed if the 
trial record, examined in a light most favorable to the lower 
courtf contains evidence that would support the finding. Sharf 
v. BMG Corporation/ 8 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (04/16/85). Section 
78-36-12.6(1)(b) requires that an owner re-rent at a "fair 
rental value." Was the rental rate sought by Fashion Placef 
$15.00 to $20.00 per square foot/ a "fair rental value"? 
Mrs. Smith of Glad Rags testified without contradiction 
that when she closed the store leases were commonly going at 
the Fashion Place Mall for around $17.00 per square foot. (R. 
494). It was her impression that Fashion Place would not be 
damaged by Glad Rags' leaving because the space would be relet 
for approximately twice what Glad Rags was paying. (R. 494f 
495). Mr. Garwood/ the center manager/ testified without 
contradiction that the fair market value of the lease was 
between $15.00 and $20.00 per square foot. (R. 362). No other 
evidence was presented at trial as regards the fair rental 
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I 
value of the premises. 
On appeal, Glad Rags urges this court to ignore Section 
78-36-12.6(1)(b), and instead hold that the duty to mitigate 
requires a lessor to attempt to relet abandoned premises for 
less than the fair rental value. That suggestion should be 
rejected. 
The law does not and should not require that a lessor 
"fire sale" his premises for the benefit of a breaching tenant. 
Section 78-36-12.6(1) only requires that an owner seek to 
re-rent at a "fair rental value." The discussion of this issue 
in Glad Rags' Brief on Appeal (p. 33) completely ignores 
Section 78-36-12.6(1)(b). The cases cited by Glad Rags, all 
decided prior to the 1981 adoption of that section, merely 
stand for the undisputed proposition that a lessor must take 
reasonable steps to mitigate his damages. This court should 
reject the suggestion that a reasonable lessor must re-rent at 
less than a fair rental value in order to meet its duty to 
mitigate. 
POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Glad Rags argues on appeal that the judgment of the 
trial court, awarding Fashion Place exactly 50% of the 
arrearages which accrued between December 31, 1981 and April 1, 
1983, is inconsistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of Law, and is not supported by evidence adduced at trial. 
Fashion Place, cross appealing on this issue, agrees. 
The trial court found as a matter of fact, that the 
actual arrearages which accrued between Glad Rags' abandonment 
of the premises and the reletting of those premises was 
$24,267.87. (Finding 4; R. 282; App. p. 2). The trial court 
concluded as a matter of law, under Section 78-36-12.6, that 
Fashion Place was entitled to recover rent accrued during the 
period necessary to relet at a fair rental value. (Conclusion 
8; R. 283; App. p. 5). Finally, the trial court found that the 
efforts of Fashion Place to relet were reasonable. (Finding 3; 
R. 280; App. p. 2). 
Inexplicably, the judgment awarded Fashion Place is 
only one-half of the actually accrued lease charges. 
Fashion Place cross appeals this aspect of the 
judgment, and requests that this action be remanded to the 
lower court with the instruction that the judgment be amended 
so as to be consistent with the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered below. 
POINT VI 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
GLAD RAGS ABANDONED ANY PERSONAL 
PROPERTY LEFT IN THE LEASEHOLD IS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The trial court found that as a matter of fact that any 
property which Glad Rags left in the premises after closing the 
store was abandoned. (Finding of Fact 7; R. 282; App. p. 3) 
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This finding has substantial support in the trial record* 
Mr. Garwood, the center manager, testified that he gave Jeffrey 
Smith of Glad Rags permission to store unidentified miscellanous 
property in the abandoned premises on the condition that Glad 
Rags removed whatever was left upon 48 hours notice to do so from 
Fashion Place. (R. 451). Garwood testified that he later phoned 
Jeffrey Smtih and requested that the items left be removed. (R. 
451). Jeffrey Smith denied ever receiving such a request. (R. 
540). However, Smith admitted that he never at any time 
requested the return of the items left in the abandoned premises. 
(R. 549). The obvious inference to be drawn from these facts is 
that Glad Rags had no interest in reclaiming whatever property 
was left in the premises. 
The trial court's finding that the property was abandoned 
is certainly supported by the testimony of Mr. Garwood. On that 
basis, the finding of the lower court should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
POINT VII 
FASHION PLACE WILL RETURN GLAD RAGS' 
SECURITY DEPOSIT UPON SATISFACTION OF 
THE JUDGMENT AWARDED HEREIN. 
Fashion Place agrees that Glad Rags is entitled to 
credit for the security deposit held by Fashion Place. That 
security deposit is in the form of a First Federal Savings and 
Loan Savings passbook, account no. 2-280377-20, payable to Glad 
Rags Inc., containing $2,267.00 as of September 26, 1974. 
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Fashion Place agrees to surrender the passbook to Glad 
Rags upon satisfaction of the judgment awarded herein. Fashion 
Place hereby indicates its willingness to stipulate to an 
appropriate modification of the lower court judgment on this 
point. 
CONCLUSION 
A fair review of the record on appeal reviews that each 
of the lower court's findings is supported by substantial, 
often uncontradicted, evidence. Those findings should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
The legal arguments advanced by Glad Rags suffer from 
one overwhelming general defect. For the most part those 
arguments ignore the controlling statute, Section 78-36-12.6, 
adopted in 1981. Instead of addressing this new addition to 
the Utah statutes, the appellant concentrates on dated case 
law, obsolete under the new statute. 
However, on two points, Fashion Place and Glad Rags are 
in agreement. 
First, the judgment awarding Fashion Place only 
one-half of the arrearages which actually accrued prior to 
reletting is inconsistent with the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. This action needs to be remanded to the 
lower court with instructions to modify the judgment to 
accurately reflect the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Second, Fashion Place agrees that Glad Rags is entitled 
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( 
to have the security deposit credited against the judgment 
awarded herein, and hereby stipulates to a surrender of the 
passbook upon satisfaction of the judgment. 
Finally, Fashion Place should be awarded reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred by it in this appeal. Attorney's fees 
were awarded by the lower court, and are provided for in the 
lease agreement. (Exhibit 1; R. 30). 
DATED this c ^ day of July, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GREEN & BERRY 
TP^/CX^ 
Raymond Scott Berry 
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I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and 
accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant to Ralph C. Petty attorney for Appellant at 721 
Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 this ~^_j>day of 
July, 1985. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this rfD day of 
July, 1985. 
W u >^6-7TQ 
My commission expires: 
LhLhm 
Notary Public /_ ^ T \ 
Residing^t: Salt Lake County 
Utah 
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GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Late* County Utah 
FE3 8 1985 
tf. D^<* Htofy i CtyttMMfcit Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES, 
a Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLAD RAGS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil NO. C82-8908 
Judge David B. Dee 
The above-entitled action carae on for non-jury trial, 
pursuant notice, on December 12, 1984, Raymond Scott Berry 
appearing on behalf of Plaintiff and Ralph Petty appearing on 
behalf of Defendant. The Honorable David B. Dee presiding as 
trier-of-fact. The parties advised the Court that they were 
ready to proceed. Plaintiff and Defendant called witnesses, who 
were sworn and gave testimony, and introduced documentary 
evidence, which was received by the Court. Both sides rested 
their case, and pursuant to request of the Court closing 
arguments were submitted in written form. Good cause appearing 
therefore, this Court makes the following: 
2Y*J 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff as Lessor and Defendant as Lessee 
entered into a written Lease Agreement. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
1) The lease term was for fifteen (15) years and the expiration 
date of the term was December 31, 1990. 
2. The Defendant breached the Lease Agreement by: 
a. Abandoning the premises on or about December 
31, 1981. 
b. Failing to pay the lease charges required by 
the Lease Agreement after December 31, 1981. 
3. That Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to relet the 
premises at a fair market value, and that said premises were 
actually relet on or about April 1, 1983. 
4. That between December 31, 1981 and the date of the 
abandonment April 1, 1983, the date on which the premises were 
relet, lease arrearages required under the Lease Agreement 
accrued in the amount of $24,467.87. 
5. That the Lessor did not, in writing, waive any 
provision of the Lease Agreement, and that the Center Manager, 
Robert Garwood, did not have authority to modify the lease. 
6. That under the terms of the written Lease Agreement, 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred in this 
action, and that Plaintiff incurred reasonable costs in the 
amount of $329.59, and reasonable attorney's fees in the amount 
of $4,515.00, through trial of the action. 
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7 . Fixtures. 
a. The allegedly converted fixtures were actually 
abandoned by the Defendant and never requested their 
return prior to the reletting of the premises. 
b. That the signs abandoned by Defendant (items 1 
and 2) have no fair market value since no market exists 
for the signs of Glad Rags Inc., a continuing company. 
c. That the Defendant's expert witness, Mr. 
Kyser, had not seen any of the allegedly converted items, 
did not know how old they were, and had no independent 
knowledge of their condition. 
d. That items no. 12, 13, 14 and 15 on the 
schedule of allegedly converted fixtures, were light 
fixtures, which are the property of the Plaintiff under 
the provisions of the Lease Agreement. (Article 14, page 
13). 
8. That under Section 78-26-12.6 UCA (1953 as amended) 
the premises were abandoned and Plaintiff is entitled to retake 
the premises and attempt to rent them at a fair rental value, and 
that Defendant is therefore liable for the rent accrued during 
the period necessary to rent the premises at a fair rental value. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the Findings of Fact set forth above, and good 
cause appearing therefore, this Court hereby makes the following 
Conclusions of Law. 
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1. That Plaintiff as Lessor and Defendant as Lessee 
entered into a written Lease Agreement. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
1) The Lease terra was for fifteen (15) years and the expiration 
date of the term was December 31, 1990. 
2. The Defendant breached the Lease Agreement by: 
a. Abandoning the premises on or about December 
31, 1981. 
b. Failing to pay the lease charges required by 
the Lease Agreement after December 31, 1981. 
3. That Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to relet the 
premises at a fair market value, and that said premises were 
actually relet on or about April 1, 1983. 
4. That between December 31, 1981 and the date of the 
abandonment, April 1, 1983, the date on which the premises were 
relet, lease arrearages required under the Lease Agreement 
accrued in the amount of $24,467.87. 
5. That the Lessor did not, in writing, waive any 
provision of the Lease Agreement, and that the Center Manager, 
Robert Garwood, did not have authority to modify the lease. 
6. That under the terms of the written Lease Agreement, 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred in this 
action, and that Plaintiff incurred reasonable costs in the 
amount of $329.59, and reasonable attorney's fees in the amount 
of $4,515.00, through trial of the action. 
7. Fixtures. 
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a* The allegedly converted fixtures were 
actually abandoned by the Defendant and Defendant never 
requested their return prior to the reletting of the 
premises. 
b. That the signs abandoned by Defendant (items 
1 and 2) have no fair market value since no market 
exists for the signs of Glad Rags, Inc., a continuing 
company. 
c. That the Defendant's expert witness, Mr. 
Kyser, had not seen any of the allegedly converted 
items, did not know how old they were, and had no 
independent knowledge of their condition. 
d. That items no. 12, 13, 14 and 15 on the 
schedule of allegedly converted fixtures, were light 
fixtures, which are the property of the Plaintiff under 
the provisions of the Lease Agreement. (Article 14, 
page 13) . 
8. That under Section 78-26-12.6 UCA (1953 as amended) 
the premises were abandoned and Plaintiff is entitled to retake 
the premises and attempt to rent them at a fair rental value, and 
that Defendant is therefore liable for the rent accrued during 
the period necessary to rent the premises at a fair rental value, 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant 
in the following categories: 
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10. That Defendant's Counterclaim should be dismissed 
with prejudice, no cause of action. 
DATED this y day of February, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge of t^e District Court 
Paae -6- / <:*i? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
...) W - « - » * - J <.>a*i ( FJLrr -
S*«* -«**« Oct 
H
^^^fe^-
8 y t "'" 
GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry (0311) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
a^-ss-^ibcwvs 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C82-8908 
Judge David B. Dee 
Court 
0»Otttv CI#* ' 
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES, ) 
A Limited Partnersh 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 





The above-entitled action came on regularly for non-jury 
trial, pursuant to Notice, December 12, 1984, Raymond Scott Berry 
appearing on behalf of Plaintiff and Ralph Petty appearing on 
behalf of the Defendant, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding as 
trier-of-fact. The parties advised the Court that they were 
ready to proceed. The Plaintiff and Defendant called witnesses, 
who were sworn and gave testimony, and introduced documentary 
evidence, which was received by the Court. Both sides rested 
their cases, and closing arguments were submitted in written form 
pursuant to the request of the Court. Having reviewed the 
evidence presented at trial, and having considered the arguments 
of counsel, and having entered the Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, this Court 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1, Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff 
against this Defendant in the amount of $17,077.59, said sum 
including therein attorney's fees in the amount of $4,515.00 and 
costs of court in the amount of $329.00. Said judgment shall 
bear interest at the statutory rate until paid. 
2. Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice, 
no cause of action, 
DATEI 
BY THE COURT: 
action, ^ 
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F A S H I O N PLACE LEASE 
ID consideration of tin* rent- and eownaut- In-rciiKiftrr set forth, Landlord herchy Ira^ev to 
Tenant, and Tenant herc!»\ n nl- Imm Landlord, the following dcsciibed premises niton the 
iullow m;j lei in > and eomhl t« >n -: 
.\rli«-lr I 
I I \ I ) . \ \ 1 K . \ T \ I \ I I! \SL i'l!(>\ l < i n \ S : 
Uill( Juno 10. 1974 
Landloid: La-Lion Pine Associates, a Limited LartncrMiip, in s\hieh Lrucst \V. Ilahn, 
Inc.. i- (In- ( inn i al Partner. 
Tenant: Glad Rags, Inc . , a Utah Corporation 
! mani -, 
rade \ i imc: 
Glad Rcicjs 
Fi f teen 
(Art icle? 
and Kxhibit "W) 
Lea-eTum: ^ l l _ t ^ : , , . . _ „ . . ! . . „ _ ( „_ . ! !> ) 
full cal< ndar year- (phi- a partial calrndar A ear. if an v, prior to I lie 
(u>t full ca lendar w a r ) . ' ( A r t i c l e d ) 
Miniuiuru Annual Menial: Thir teen Thousand Six Hundred *— 
hollars (5 J 3.> 600. 00. . . _ ) per annmiK pa\ aide in twelve (12) 
(•([iiid monthly in-tallmeut- during each war. (Article 5A) 
Six Percentage Mental: 
Tenant's Share of 
Knclo-ed Mall L\peu-e. : h9A. 
Address for Notices: 
. percent ( _6_ c/c) (Article 5C) 
_ _ percent ( 1-.0J %) (Article 20) 
To Landlord: 2') I I West LISe^uudo L>ulevard 
Hawthorne, California {)l\'2*0 
and to Landlord's manajunent 
office in the Shopping Center 
To Tenant: To the demi-ed premi-e- and 
2147 Last 21st Soutn 
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84109 
Security Deposit- Two Thousand £*W Hundred Sixty-Seven-
hollarW* J f : ^ 
(Article : j | ) 
(Art ic le : i l ) 
KiTerence.- in this Article I to other Article.- are for con\enience and designate some of 
the other Articles where reference- to the particular Fundamental Least- Provision- appear. Lach 
reference in this Lea-e to ,ww of tin- Fundamental LcaMTro\ i-ionr> contained in this, Article I .-hall 
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be c o n s t r u e d to m e o r p o r a l e al l o f the t e r m - p r o v i d e d under each Mich F u n d a m e n t a! I. < \ w P ro -
v i s i on . I n t ie- event o f MW c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n any F u n d a m e n t a l Lease I V o s i - i o n and the balance o f the 
L c a - e , (he la! ter -ha l l c o n t r o l . 
A r t i c l e 2 
K-XIII 
T h e f o l l o w i n g d raw ings and special p r o v i s i o n - are a t t ached here to a> e x h i b i t s and made a part 
o f th is Lea-e : 
E X I I I K I T " \ " • ( i e n e r a l site p lan o f an i n teg ra ted re ta i l s h o p p i n g cen te r t o he k n o w n a^ 
" F a - h i o u P lace " w h i c h L a n d l o r d a m ! o the rs i n t e n d to cons t r uc t or eau.-e l o he c o n s t r u c t e d (>n 
a p p r o x i m a t e Iv o I jcic- o f I n id m lh»- Ci t v o f M u r r a y , C o u n t y o f Salt L a k e , S la te o f I11 ah , and b e i n ^ 
l o c a t e d on the m>rthea.-t co rne r o f o HM) Soi11!i St reet and S la te S t ree t , he re i na f t e r r e f e r red io a.- the* 
" S h o p p i n g C e n t e r . " Said site p lan shows , amonj j ; o t h e r th ings , the p r i n c i p a l i m p r o v e m e n t - w h i c h 
w i l l c o m p i l e .-aid s h o p p i n g r e i t t e i . I V u a n t acknow ledges tha t the >ite [) lan s h o w n o n K\ lu !> i t \ V 
is l e u t a t i \ e and that L a n d l o u l max change the shape, M ' / C , l o c a t i o n , n u i n h e r and e x t e n t o f the 
i m p r o v e m e n t - s h o w n the reon and e l i m i n a t e or add any i m p r o v e m e n t s to any p o r t i o n o f the 
S h o p p i n g Cen te r , p r o v i d e d that L a n d l o r d -ha l l no t change the size or l o c a t i o n o f the premises 
w i t h o u t the T e n a n t ' s con ( l i t . 
K X t l l l i l T ' " [ > " - H e s e r i p t i o n o f the prern i -es , a u t h o r i z e d use ami Tenan t ' s , t rade n a m e . 
E X H I B I T " C " - D e s c r i p t i o n o f w o r k t o he p e r f o r m e d bv L a n d l o r d and b y ' I V n a n t in or o n 
the premises . 
E \ I I i M T " E " ? T e n a n t ^ C e r t i f i c a t e . 
E X H I B I T " F ^ - S ^ n C r i t e r i a . 
E X H I B I T " G ' 1 - ASSIGNMENT OF PASSBOOK. 
Article 3 
P R E M I S E S 
T h e L a n d l o r d he reby leases and demises u n t o the T e n a n t and the T e n a n t h e r e b y le?_-cs and 
takes- f r o m the L a n d l o r d , fo r the t e r m , at the r e n t a l , and u p o n the covenan ts and c o n d i t i o n - here in -
a f t e r set f o r t h , the c o m m e r c i a l space re fe r red t o here in as the ' ' p r e m i s e s / ' and descr ibed on 
E x h i b i t " i r * a t t a c h e d he re to and m a d e a par t he reo f . T h e p rem ise * shal l he e o n s t r i i e t e d in acco rd -
ance w i t h the p r o c e d u r e s o u t l i n e d in E x h i b i t ' ' ( ^ a t t a c h e d he re to and made a p a r t h e r e o f . 
Article 4 
TERM 
T h e t e rm o f th is Lea-e shal l Le<_on as o f the date h e r e o f and shal l c o n t i n u e l l i e r e a f l e r d u r i n g 
the Lease T e r m spec i f ied in A r t i c l e I he reo f , unless sooner t e r m i n a t e d a> he re i na f t e r p r o v i d e d in th i s 
Lea -e . Said Lca-e I e rm -ha l l be c o m p u t e d f r o m the f i rst d,i\ id* Janua ry o f the year f o l l o w i n g t he 
da te w h e n the m i n i m u m annua l ren ta l p r o v i d e d for in A r t i c l e I hereof shall have c o m m e n c e d . T h e 
L a n d l o r d agrees to de l iver to the T e n a n t , and the T e n a n t agrees l o accept f r o m the L a n d l o r d , 
po<>e.s.>ion o f the p r e m i s e - f o r t h w i t h u p o n c o m p l e t i o n o f the L a n d l o r d s W o r k i n the premises as, 
-2-
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d» \ - rn ! " -d in L \ L ib i t V ' ( . ' ln ' i eo t . Ler h flea I ion *»i ( l ie a rch i tec t by w h o m I l ie Tin a I p lans and • i i r i i i n \ | . 
l i<u i - U I T C p repared (hat (he L a n d l o r d ' - Work in (he premise.-. ha> l u n i c o m p l e t e d in aceordam e 
w i f h snd L ^ h ' l n t • ' ( ' ; " d i a l l f i r e.. f H | I I -J \r j f , < | b i n d i n g Upon the par l ies he re to . I n the event the 
i i i l i l i n i i i i i i annua l ren ta l p r o v i d e d tor ;n \ r l h l< I has not c o m m e n c e d w i t h i n ( h i r e (.',) \ .
 l 4 . i r . n n 
l l i t* da le h e r c o t , 11 it* f i t i n - Lease shall t e r m i n a t e a- o f said date and each u l the pa r t i es hereto . d u l l 
be re lea-ed f r o m any L u t h e r o b l i g a t i o n he reunder . 
V> i l l i if i ten ( I 0) da \ s a l te r I IK1 m i n i m u m annua l ren ta l p r u \ ided for m A r t i c l e I has c o m m e n c e d , . 
l e n a n t w i l l execu te and del iver to L a n d l o r d a < r tit n a t c subs tan t i a l l y in the f o r m a t t ached he re to , 
m a r k e d h x h i b i t l ' K " and made a part he reo f , i n d i c a t i n g t he reon anv e x c e p t i o n s t h t T e t o w lu< h t iu i \ 
ex is t at that t i m e . Fa i l u re o f the T e n a n t to execu te and de l iver M i d i ee r t d i ea te shal l c o n s t i t u t e an 
accep tance ot the p rem ise - and an a c k n o w l e d g m e n t bv Tenan t that the s t a t e m e n t s i m ' ; i d e d in 
b x h i b i t "\'V' are t rue and eo r ree t . w i t h o u t e v r p t i o n . In a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o , j f T e n a n t fa i l s to execute 
and de l iver M i d i s ta tement to L a n d l o r d w i t h i n -aid len-dav p e r i o d . L a n d l o r d rna\ , as a t to rney in 
LM I < .1 I 'enant. <on p led w i t h an in te res t , exec u te -in h s ta tement fo r , and on beha l f , and m the name 
o i the I en an I. It re ip ie s h d hv L a n d l o r d in w ri t n e . Tenan t shall ^ i \ e s imi lar eei t i f ieah\> f r o m l i m e t o 
t une d iume. the t e rm ot t lu> Lea>e in the manner here inabove p r o v i d e d . 
\ r t i e l e ."i 
K K \ T \ L 
I he l e n a n t agrees to pav a , i m l al l< »r the u -e ami oeeupanev i d I be premises., a l t he t uae - and 
in the m a n n e r he rema l ter prov i d e d . the fo l l ow in- ; -urns o f mouev : 
A . MI N I \ I I \ | \ , \ M \ L K I - ; . \ T \ I , T h e m i n i m u m annua l ren ta l .specif ied in A r t i c l e 1 h e r e o f 
.-ball be pavah le in twe lve (\'2) equa l m o n t h l y i ns ta l lmen ts d u r i n g each year , in advance , on tr ie 
f i rs t (biv o f each ca lendar m o u t h , w i t h o u t o f f se t o r d e d u c t i o n , c o m m e n c m g ^ v J ' y - ^ ^ ) - * ! * * * - * 
^ 4 t H - t 4 i ^ ^ ^ H ^ U - 4 » I ^ H ^ 4 ^ ^ ^ 4 ^ H ^ U M U ^ U ^ h r v - ^ : — Ut**^>4-<^^lMV^W.^U.w^UwUUKl4 .v l»4Ui - -Ci^4N!»?» ' - *n 
or w h e n the T e n a n t o p e n - fo r buMi ie -s . v \ luehever i- ear l ier . S h o u l d the ren ta l p e r i o d commence- o n 
a dav ( j f the m o n t h o t h e r t han the f i r - l d^\ o f - in h m o n t h , then the ren ta l l u r the f i r s t I rae t iuna l 
m o n t h shall he c o m p u t e d on a dai lv ba- is for the pe r i od f r o m the date u l c o m m e n c e m e n t to the end 
o f such ca lendar m o u t h and at an a m o u n t e i j i ia l to one- th ree h u n d r e d s i x t i e t h ( l / ' l 6 0 ) o f the s l i d 
m i n i m u m annua l ren ta l fo r each n u l l dav . and the rea f te r shal l l ie c o m p u t e d and p a i d as a foresa id . 
IT T A X K S . In a d d i t i o n to i\\\d c o m m e n c i n g w i t h the m i n i m u m annua l r e n t a l p r o v i d e d f o r 
i n pa rag raph A a b o v e , the T e n a n t agrees to pav to L a n d l o r d , as a d d i t i o n a l r e n t , d u r i n g each vear 
o r p a r t i a l vear o f the t e r m o f th is l.ea.-e. the a m o u n t ( i f a n y ) by w h i c h the taxes a n d a s - e - m e n t s 
l ev ied and assessed f o r anv M I C I I \ e a r U[>on the premises and the u n d e r l v i n g rea l t y .shall exceed an 
a m o u n t et jua l t o T h i r t v d i v c ( l e n t - (.?..'J.">) m u l t i p l i e d by the n u m b e r o f square feet o f F l o u r A r e a 
c o n t a i n e d m the p rem ise - . S u c h a d d i t i o n a l rent fo r anv pa r t i a l year o f the t e r m h e r e o f shai! be p r o -
r a t e d o n a t ime basis. I ' a v m e n l shall be made bv 'Lenant w i t h i n t h i r t y (!{(.)) days a f t e r receipt o f a 
w r i t t e n Mate m e n I f r o m L a n d l o r d se t t i ng f o r t h the a m o u n t o f M H h t a \ excess a n d s h o w i n g in reason-
able de ta i l the m a n n e r in w h i c h it ha- been c o m p u t e d . 
In the event the pr< mi -es ami the nuder l v im_: rea l ty are iu>l separately assessed, b u t are part ot 
a larger parcel fo r a-se — m e n l p u r p o s e - ( h e r e i n a f t e r re fe r red to as the " l a rge r p a r c e l " ) . * T a \ e - .md 
a— e.-smei i t - lev ied and a—e-sed u p o n the p rem i -es and the u n d e r l y i n g r e a l t y " shal l mean a 
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I . II ' 
Mr I r a c l m n a l p o r t i o n o f .-.an! taxes ami a a ' s M i i c n f 
MM f i t - m i a n \ c o m m o n area.-, t he reon) l l i r n u m ' ' • ' ' " ' * 
p remise* ,in«l ( l i r d e n o m i n a t o r o f w i n c h d u l l <" Mr | 
c \ c ln .M\c u-e ami occupancy hy tenants o l l l i r l " ; " M I' , n 1 
open lo r I I I I H H C > S , p r o v i d e d that an r i p u t a h l e adjo i n " 
par t ia l i s c o m p l e t e d on l l i r d a l r M H I I t a \ e - ami •» " ; " 
1
 . . » ' 
, 'H ' • 
M I I " 
I i assessments w h i c h m a \ he levied against or u p o n M'«
l
 J1 
u n d e r the law> (hen in force m a y he ev idenced l»> «' *! I#l" *
 (1, » " , i 
annua l i n> [a i lmen ts , o n N (lie a m o u n t o f Mich anmed in M •> | ^ 
pa r t i a l \ e a r ) and s ta tu to ry interest shall he i nc luded w > l h l "
 j i ; 
a--e>^ment- Jewed a<iain>t the p r r m i - e - . ind l l i r u n d r i n I
 ( w 
* T a \ e ^ ' vhall a l -o i nc lude any tax a^essed upon <"' " i«a •M P ' 
in c o i i f i n ' t i o n w i t h th is Lease. 
c. I 'LLTLNTAOI: H I ; M . \ I , Tenant siuii >Lo r" 
\ l l l 
o f the Tt nant (as the te rm '"net sale>" 1- def in* d 
p r e m i - e - d u r i n g ea< h calendar year. Said |>< r * * '*' • * '' ,i 
q u a r t e r AIM\, o n or h r f o r e the t w e n t i e t h ( J O l M das ol I I " ' 
* 1 1 
the ( lo-e o f each M i d i p e r i o d , the Tenant shall p ' • M' 
' < .l«i 
so c o m p u l e d a< a percentage o f m l -ale- ol ihc I « " , M
 ( 
r r n l . i l w h i c h the T e n a n t .du l l have paid d u i r u " ' ' ' ' " " ,, 
1 I (• 
re fe r red to .shall he the pen r n t .specified a- ' T e n • " ! ' ^ 
A t Ihc close o f eacli ca lendar vear ^ " , j U , , M , M ^ 
d e t e r m i n e d the net sales o f the Tenan t d n r m j * »«•' " * ' ^ 
l o r d a- m i n i m u m annua l ren ta l fo r -aid . .»•• "• " 
percentage r e n t a l ; and t h e r e u p o n an a ' l p ' % , n M . ^ 
1 i i I j * - * * * * 1 
f o l l ow. - : I f the T e n a n t d u l l have p u d I " •' ' . , „ 
I ! , • % # * » * ***** 
q u i r e d to pay unde r the terms he reo l . | h ' ' ^ ^
 k, ^ 
a m o u n t o r . i f the Tenan t .-hall have p•»••' * " ^ ^ . . ^ i * 
h e r e u n d e r , then T e n a n t shall f o r t h w i t h p-^ " ' * 
For the purpo>e o f c«.mf>ulu' ! ' ' ' ..-, • ' * *" 
r e n t a l - c o m m e n c e >hall h added l,% 
( e n l a c e rent due and pavahle I " ' ' ' " 
o f m i n i m u m annua! ren ta l w h u h I • ' 
f >' 
L h * • * ' * 
- - » * * . : . . . J * • 
, • '• 
I ) . S T V T K M K N T < j ! ' M ! 
to the l a n d l o r d a Materm :\\ ,,-< 
each ca lendar m o n t h , and ,!<• , M " 
each ca lendar v ear. Such *' ' ' ' " ' 
or h \ a r c - p o u - i h l e off ic» r »• ' ' 
<** i o«%> "• 
/Wt 13 fe-^ 
l^^ >J 
C ^ V ' ^ 
A^v-n^s 
^ v v . ' . ' i 
2- V ' ^ l J 
M c^d tew 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
!• " . - m i l . . • - • '»nl r and I ' th 'T pe r t i nen t data o f the grn-vs sales and " n r l s a l e - " as h e r e i n a f t e r d e f i n e d , 
and In : - : * •-- r e l a t i ng lo t lu* p r e m i <- ( i n c l u d i n g the gross salens and net -ales o f a n y sub tenan t , 
;,- - f i -r t- ; • • »/i<t —lonanv) and M i d i h o o k s and records .-hall he kep i for a p e r i o d o f t H O (J ) \ ears 
- i f i -T the '•.-<• o f each ca lendar year. 1 tu* rece ip t bv L a n d l o r d o f a n \ s t a temen t o r any paymen t o f 
: . •• - : • . 'T iL i . " ren ta l l«.»r anv p e r i o d . ha l l not h i n d it a> to the* eor rec tne-o o l t lu* s t a t e m e n t or the pav-
: ; : - . ' ! t . ^ , . : i : n t w o (2) vear- a f te r t h r rece ip t o f i inv such s t a t e m e n t . L a n d l o r d at a n y t ime d u l l he 
'.T.i i t lr-d [•> an aud i t o f : i n h --iro-s -a le- and net rales e i the r bv L a n d l o r d or by a c e r t i f i e d pub l ic ae-
• -..uritaMt ;o be des ignated by L a n d l o r d . Such aud i t ahal l be l i m i t e d to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the 
"r.-.-t r j ! « - - " a- d e f i n e d in t i n - Lease and .-hall be c o n d u c t e d d u r i n g n o r m a l business h o u r s and e i t he r 
•at the ; \ - " ; i -e - or t! ie p r i n c i p a l place o f bu- ine-s o f T e n a n t . I f i t .-hall be d e t e r m i n e d as a result o f 
- i . - h au ! i r . i ri.it there ha- b e n a de f i r i cncv in the p a y m e n t o f percentage ren t , then Mich d r f i c iencv 
d i!l !•'-• • • .':'• i m med ia te I v due and pa\ able w i t h int* i(\st at the ra le o f ten percent ( I 0*7) per a n n u m 
i r v i n i\<- •:. '{ '• w h e n -a id pa_v m e n t s h o u l d ha \e been made. I n a d d i t i o n , i f T e n a n t ' s .statement fo r the 
> r t m e i . t ahmdar y\u~ -ha l l In* t o t i u d to ha \e unde rs ta ted net sales bv mo re than t w o percent i 2 7 ) 
:.\ d L J : : « ! ' - id i- e n t i t l e d to any a d d i t i o n a l percentage ren ta l a-> a result o f -a id u n d e r s t a t e m e n t , t hen 
•::.'- I c i . j . n ; -bal l pav all o i L a n d l o r d " - rea-miab le costs and e \ p e n - e s c o n n e c t e d t h e r e w i t h . Anv inl 'or-
:*;:-ti«»n j . - led f r o m -in It - la temeut . - or in . -peet io i i ^ 11 * 111 be c o n f i d e n t i a l and shal l no t be d i - c l o -ed 
o i i i r - r t : ia : to rar rv o u t the p u r p o - e - he reo f : p r o v i d e d , h o w e v e r , L a n d l o r d >hall be p e r m i t t e d t o 
h . t d ^ e |b - • v .n ten t - o | anv M H I I - t a t e n i e i i t - in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h any f i n a n c i n g arrangement . - o r 
! — ; j n u . e f ; > .,( L a n d l o r d - in t ere-I in the prerni.-e- or in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h an \ a d m i n i s t r a t i v e or j ud ic ia l 
or • >• ••edi .n.- in u ! i n li L a n d l o r d i- m \ ( d \ e d and where L a n d l o r d I I I ; I \ he r e q u i r e d l o d ivu lge - uch 
i ; : : ' o r u ! - l i ' -a. 
L. I ' e I 'emint -ha l l pa \ , a- a d d i t i o n a l r en t , all sums o f monev requ i r ed to be pa id pu r -u .mt to 
; L - t e r m - >\ t i n - \ r t i e |» ' " i . the -urn.- to be pa id p u r s u a n t to A r t i c l e s l ( b 20 and 20 o f t h i s Lea-e. and 
A\ o t h e r -
 < ; : i - o f rnoj iev ur charges r e q u i r e d to be pa id b\ T e n a n t u n d e r th is Least!, w h e t h e r o r no t 
'.!:- -AW -• :•• d e ^ ^ n a t e i l " a d d i t i o n a l r e n t . " I f such a m o u n t s or charges are n o t pa id at the t ime p ro -
• im-d i»; t! i- Lea-e . thev -ha l l neverthr le—- he co l l ec t i b l e as a d d i t i o n a l rent w i t h the n e x t ins ta l lment 
o f n i i i ! * r : , . : : ! annua l ren ta l t l i e rea f te r fa l l i ng d u e . bu t n o t h i n g here in c o n t a i n e d shal l be deemed t o 
- ' i - p r -nd o.r d-dav the pav meu t o f a u \ a m o u n t o f m o n e y or charge at the t i m e the same becomes due 
j i i ' . i pav an. • he reunde r , or l i m i t anv o t h e r remedv o f L a n d l o r d . 
F. I« Tenan t - l ia l l fa i l to pa \ . w h e n the same* is due and payab le . an \ rent o r any add i t i ona l 
r e ' . t . or a.'.-.ount- or charge* ^\' the charac te r desi l i b e d in A r t i c l e n l \ he reo f , such u n p a i d a m o u n t s 
-ha l l b r . T meres t at the rate o f ten percent ( I 0 7 ) per a n n u m f r o m the da le due to the dale o f pay-
: : r m t . In - b h t i o n to - m h in te res t , i f Tenan t -ha l l fa i l to pav any m o n t h l y i n s t a l l m e n t o f m i n i m u m 
annua l P-: :a! bv the f i f t h dav o f the m o n t h such i ns ta l lmen t is d u e . a late charge equa l to one-
t i . r t i r t : : < ;<)) «if the m o n l l d v i u - t a l l m e u t o f m i n i m u m annua l ren ta l -hal l be assessed ^IA -hal l 
j . rue f.,,- < ieh dav b e v i n l -a id f i f t h dav o f the m o n t h u n t i l Mich r e n t a l , i n c l u d i n g the late . ba rge . 
;- p.id :.-: ; :il. 
C \\[ r» r i ta l and oth« r pav ruen ts -ha l l be pa id b y the Tenan t t o the L a n d l o r d at i ts manage-
rf.-?'t «»:: : i thr S h o p p i n g Cen te r , or at -uch o t h e r place a- may f r o m t l ine t o t i m e be de-i-.matcd 
bv ;:,r- L i i ' . r d in w r i t i n g at lea-t ten ( 10) (\A\ - p r i o r to the nex t ensu ing pas m e n t d a t e . 
\ r t ;« l e o 
l»KFIMI b »\ <)F "NF.T.-M.r /S" 
* \ - i - d r - " o f the T e n a n t , a- u-i d in th is Lea-e , is d e f i n e d to be the gross se l l i ng priee o f a l l 
r r . -p ha r i • : . - • or - e n i e r - - o l d in or f r o m the premises b y the T e n a n t , its s u b t e n a n t s , l i c e n c e s and 
^ IU 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Article 16 
TKNAiNT , S(; ( )NI) i :c :TOriU'SI : \KSS 
The Tenant covenants and agrees that, continuously and uninterruptedly from and after its 
initial openiri" for business, it will operate and conduct within the premises the business which it is 
permitted to operate and conduct under the provisions hereof, except while the premises are un-
tenantable by reason of fire or other casualty, and that it will at all times keep and maintain within 
and upon the premises an adequate slock of merchandise and trade fixtures to service and supply 
the usual and ordinarv demands and requirements of its customers ami that it will keep its premises 
it) a neat, clean and orderlv condition. Tenant agrees, that all (rash and rubbish of the said Tenant 
shall be deposited within receptacles and that there shall be no trash receptacles permitted to remain 
outside of the building. Tenant further agrees to cause such receptacles to be emptied and trash 
removed at its own cost and expense. 
Recognizing that it is in the interests of both the Tenant and the Landlord to have regulated 
flours of business for all of the Shopping Center.* Tenant agrees that commencing with the opening 
for business bv Tenant in the premise.- and for the remainder of I he term of this Lease, Tenant shall 
be open for Lu-incss daik , Sunda\ .-and State and National I lolidav s excepted, and shall continuous-
ly so remain open for bu-inc—a! Ica-t those dass and hours as auv one ( I ) , of the two (2) department 
stores shall be open for business. Truant further agrees to have its window displays, exterior signs 
and exterior advertising displays adequate!) illuminated continuously during such hours as any of 
the department stores shall illuminate their window displa\ s. exterior signs and exterior advertising 
displa\ s. Il L> agreed, howvwr. that the foregoing provisions shall be subject, as respects any business 
controlled bv governmental regulations or labor union contracts in its hours of operation, to the 
hours of operation so prescribed bv such governmental regulations or labor union contracts, as the 
case may be. 
The Tenant agrees that it will not, during the term of this Lea*» a.lirectly or indirectly, operate 
. . . . >/thrc'L ( J ) . -
nor own any similar type of business within a radius of /&rs=^) miles from the location of the 
premises. Without limiting Landlord's remedies, in the event Tenant should violate this covenant, 
Landlord may, at its. option, include the "net sales" of such other business in the "net sales'* 
transacted from the premises for the purpose of computing the percentage rent due hereunder. 
Article 17 
REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE 
The Tenant agrees at all times, from and after delivery of possession of the premises to the 
Tenant , and at its own co-t and expense, to repair and maintain in good and tenantable condition 
the premises and every part thereof, excluding the roof, exterior walls, structural parts of the 
premises and structural floor (tloor covering, including carpeting, terrazzo or other special flooring 
installed by or at the request of Tenant, to be maintained by the Tenant) , and including without 
limitation the utility meters, pipes and conduits, all fixtures, air conditioning and heating equip-
ment serving the premise-, and other equipment therein, the store front or store fronts, all Tenant 's 
signs, locks and closing devices, and all window sash, casement or frames, door and door frames, 
and all such items of repair, maintenance and improvement or reconstruction as may at anv time or 
from time to time be required bv a governmental agency bavin" jurisdiction thereof. All jdass, both 
exterior and interior, is at the sole risk of Tenant, and any glass broken shall be promptly replaced 
by Tenant with glass of the same kind, size and quality. 
-14-
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t ' . : - I . ra - r . hv the ma jo r depai t m e n I - t o r e - in the S h o p p i n g Center shall be c r e d i t e d toward pay -
r:"-nt ot [In- en t i re tv ot -m h cmk»-<-d ma l l o p ( ' r . i l i o n and ma in tenauee expense . T e n a n t shall pay as 
i t * -hare o f 11 it- <u- t o f -neb e \ p < n - e - the p i n i n t a k e spec i f ied in \ r t i e l c I a> " T e n a n t ' s Share o f 
[-. ;:«h).M'd Mal l K x p e n - e . C o m m e n c i n g on the date the m i n i m u m annua l it n ta l prnvidr-d fo r in 
A r i l * le I h e r e o f has c o m m e n c e d , and (hereaf ter on the f i rst dav o f each ca lendar m o n t h o f the t e r m 
o f t h i - I.ea-e. l e n a n t .-hall pay to I a n d l o i d an a m o u n t es t ima ted b) L a n d l o r d to be Tenant ' - , share 
o f - i n h enc losed fr ini l o p e r a t i o n AIU\ ma in tenance expenses. L a n d l o r d may ad jus t the m o n t h l y 
e . ' n lo -ed ma l l o p e r a t i o n and m a i n t e n a n c e e x p e n - e charge o f 'Lenant at l i te end o f any ealendar 
• j u a r t e r o n the h a d - o f L a n d l o r d - exper ience and reasonab ly an t i c i pa ted costs . W i t h i n Ih i r lv ( 3 0 ) 
d j \ - f o l l o w i n g the end o l ea<h i alr-mlar qua r t e r . L a n d l o r d shall f u rn i sh T e n a n t a s ta tement cover ing 
t;.»- « a lendar ( juar te r ju - t ex[>i red. < ' f t i f i c d as cor rec t by a e e r l i f i e d p u h l i i : a c c o u n t a n t or an au tho r -
i zed re p re-en t a h v r ot L a n d l o r d . -In >w m g the t o t a l enc losed mal l o p e r a t i o n and ma in tenance expense, 
t f .e a m o u n t ot l e n a n t - share o f n u l l e \pen -es tor such ca lendar ( juar te r , and the payments made 
b;. I enant w i t h re -pec t to -ueh ca lendar ( juar ter a- .-et f o r t h a h o \ e . I f T e n a n t ' s share o f such expenses 
r - x -eed - l e n a n t " - pav mer i t - so mad ' - . T e n a n t -ha l l pay L a n d l o r d the de f i c iency w i t h i n ten (10 ) days 
a f l ' T receipt o f -a id s ta temen t . I f -a id pa \ mer i ts exceed Tenant 's : share o f - u e h expenses, Tenant shal l 
b«" e n t i t l e d to o f f se t the I 'M ' t .v a j a i n - t [ l a y m e n t - n e x t the rea f te r to become due L a n d l o r d as set 
f« '" th a b o v e . 
T e n a n t , p r o v i d e d i t - p re rn i -e - ; r o n t - o n the em losed m a l l , agrees, d u r i n g al l business hours , t o 
o p - r a t e the h e a t i n g , v e n t i l a t i n g and air < oud i t i o n u i g e q u i p m e n t serv ing the premises so that ins ide 
t e m p e r a t u r e s are m a i n t a i n e d ( i ) w i t h i n a range in w h i c h a m a j o r i t v o f adu l t s w i l l be c o m f o r t a b l e i n 
the p r e m i - e - and ( n ) w h i c h w i l l no t u n d u l y d r a m heat , v e n t i l a t i o n or c o o l e d air f r o m the enc losed 
m- i l l . L a n d l o r d agree- to eau-e the h e a t i n g , v e n t i l a t i n g and air c o n d i t i o n i n g e q u i p m e n t serving the 
em i o - r d m a l l to be -o ope ra ted du r i rn j Mich h o u r - that hea t , vent i l a t i o n and c o o l e d air are not u n d u l y 
d r o n e d f r o m the p rem ise - . ' 
Art ic le l!l 
BANkKUTCY IN-OIAT.NGY 
T h e T e n a n t agrees that in the event al l or - u b - t a n t i a l l v a l l o f the T e n a n t ' s assets be placed in 
the h a n d - ot a receiver or t r u s t e r , and such rece iversh ip or t rus teesh ip c o n t i n u e s fo r a per iod o f 
t f j i r t y ( 3 0 ) d a y - , o r s h o u l d the T e n a n t make an ass ignment f o r the bene f i t o f c r e d i t o r s o r he f i n a l l y 
a d j u d i c a t e d a b a n k r u p t , o r shou ld the l e n a n t i n s t i t u t e any p roceed ings u n d e r the B a n k r u p t c v Ac t as 
the same n o w e x i - t - o r unde r any a m e n d m e n t t he reo f w h i c h may herea f te r be e n a c t e d , or unde r 
any o t h e r act re la t i ng to the -ob jec t ot" b a n k r u p t c y w h e r e i n the T e n a n t seeks, to be ad jud ica ted a 
b a n k r u p t , or to be d ischarged o f i t - deb ts , or to e f fec t a p lan o\' l i q u i d a t i o n , c o m p o s i t i o n or re-
o r g a n i z a t i o n , o r s h o u l d a m i n v o l u n t a r v p r o c e e d i n g be f i l ed against the T e n a n t u n d e r anv such 
bar - .k rup lcv laws and -u< h proceedim.: not be r e m o v e d w i t h i n n i n e t y ( (>0) days t he rea f t e r , then th is 
L^.i.se o r anv i n te re - t in and to the premises shal l not become an asset m a n v o f such proceedings 
a n d . in anv such events and in a d d i t i o n to anv and al l r i gh ts or remedies o f the L a n d l o r d hereunder 
or o \ lavs n r o v i d e d . it -ha l l be l a w f u l f o r the L a n d l o r d t o dec lare the t e rm he reo f e n d e d and to re-
e n t e r t l ie premises and take pos -e -s ion t h e r e o f and remove al l persons t h e r e f r o m , and the Tenant 
d i - ! l have no f u r t h e r c l a i m the reon < T he reunder . T h e p rov i s i ons o f th is A r t i c l e 21 shal l also a p p l y 
t o . : i ; \ G u a r a n t o r o f th is Leas**. 
A r t i c l e 22 
D I T A l ' L T S i ;Y T F . V W f 
S h o u l d the T e n a n t at anv t i m e be in de fau l t he reunder w i t h respeel l o any r e n t a l paymen ts o r 
o t h e r id ia rge- pavab le bv the TeJiant he reunde r , and shou ld such de fau l t c o n t i n u e f o r a pe r iod o f 
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h w ( ')) da\ - after written notice from I andl«»rd to IVnanf; 01 should the Tenant he in default in (he 
n i'. mint and lull performance of anv othei o| il - pi oin IM*S, eo\ en an Is or agreements herein contained 
and -hould -in h default or breach of performance » ontmue for more than a rca-onable tune (in no 
e\ent to exceed thirtv ('M)) davs) after written notice thereof from the Landlord lo the Tenant 
specifying the particular- of Mich default or hieaeh of performance; or .should the Tenant vacate or 
ahandon the premises; then the Landlord mav treat the on urrence of any one or more of the fore-
i:oif)Lr event- as a hreaeh of this Lea e. and in addition to any or all of her rights or remedies of the 
Landlord hereunder and hv the law provided, it -hall he, at the option of the Landlord, without 
further notice or demand of any kind to Tenant or any other person: 
(a) The right of the Landlord to declare the term hereof ended and to re-enter the 
premise^ and take possession thereof and remove all persons therefrom, and the Tenant shall have 
no further claim thereon or thereunder: or 
(l») The right of the Landlord without declaring this Lease ended to re-enter the premises 
and occupv or leas-* the whole or anv part thereof for and on account of the Tenant and upon such 
terms and condition* and for such rent as the Landlord may deem proper and to collect said rent and 
any other rent that may thereafter become payable dnd apply the .same toward the amount due or 
thereafter to become due from the Tenant and on account of Mich expenses of such subletting and 
anv other damages sustained by the Landlord; and should such rental he less than that herein agreed 
to be paid by the Tenant, the Tenant agrees to pay such deficiency to the Landlord in advance on 
the day of each month hereinbefore specified for pavmeril of minimum annual rental and to pay to 
the Landlord forthwith upon anv Mich reletting the costs and expenses the Landlord may incur by 
rear-on thereof: or 
(c) The right of the Landlord, even though it may have relet said premises, to thereafter 
elect to terminate this Lease and all of the rights of the Tenant in or to the premises. 
should the Landlord have relet the premised under the provisions of subparagraph (b) 
above, it may execute anv .Mich lease either in its own name or in the name of the Tenant as it shall 
see fit. but the tenant therein named shall be under no obligation whatsoever to see to the application 
by Landlord of any rent collected by Landlord from such tenant, nor shall the Tenant hereunder 
have- any right or authority whatever to collect anv rent from such tenant. The Landlord shall not be 
deemed to have terminated this Lease, or the liability of the Tenant to pay rent thereafter to accrue, 
or it- liability for damage- under any of the provision- hereof, by any such re-entry or by any action 
in unlawful detainer, or otherwise, to obtain possession of the premises, unless the Landlord shall 
have notified the Tenant in writing that it lias so elected to terminate this Lease, and the Tenant 
further covenants that the service bv the Landlord of any notice pursuant to the unlawful detainer 
-tatutes of the Mate of L tab and the surrender of possession pursuant to such notice shall not 
(unless the Landlord elects to the contrary at the time of or at any time subsequent to the serving 
of -urli notice- and such (lection be. evidenced bv a written notice to the Tenant) be deemed to be 
a termination of thi- Lease. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as obli^atin^ the Landlord 
to relet the whole or any part of the premises. In the event of any entry or taking possession of the 
premises a- aforesaid, the L'andlord shall have the rinht. but not the obligation, to remove therefrom 
all or any part of the personal property located therein and may place the same in storage at a public 
warehouse at the expense and risk of the owner or owners thereof. 
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V 
I n (!•'• >-wnt of T e n a n t ' - de fau l t and L a n d l o r d ' - r e t a k i n g o f possession o f the prern i -es , w h e t h e r 
t h i - Lca-e i^ t e r m i n a t e d hv L a n d l o r d or i m t . I enant agrees to pay t o L a n d l o r d a>> an a d d i t i o n a l 
i t e m o f damage- the eo- t o f repai r -. a l t e r a t i o n - , r e d e c o r a t i n g , leasing c o m m i s s i o n s and L a n d l o r d ' s 
o t h e r e\[)»-n-e- i n c u r r e d in r e l e t t i n g the p i e m i - * - - to a new t enan t . 
> h o u l d the L a n d l o r d elect to t e r m i n a t e th.i- Lea-e u n d e r the p r o v i s i o n - o f subpa rag raph - (a) or 
((.) above , the L a n d l o r d .-hall t h e r e u p o n , w i t h o u t w a i t i n g fo r the end o f (he lei m h e r e o f , he en t i t l ed 
to recover t r >m the Tenan t a- damage- the d i f f e r e n c e , i f a n y , be tween the t hen reasonab le ren ta l 
w i lue o f the p t v m i - e - fnr the pe r i od of the te rm reserved in the Lease and the a m o u n t o f renta l and 
o t h e r charge- payab le by the T e n a n t fo r the balam e o f the t e r m o f th is Lease, t o g e t h e r w i t h the ren t 
t h r u u n p a i d , i f an v. 
L o r all p u r p o s e - o f t i n - A r t i c l e '22. the ren ta l agreed to be pa id by the T e n a n t o r the a m o u n t 
of r en ta l pav able by the 1 enant -ha l l be deemed to lie the m i n i m u m annua l r en ta l and a l l o ther - u r n -
r e p a i r e d to be pa id by T e n a n t p u r - u a n t to the t e r m - o f th is Lease. A l l such sums, o t h e r than the 
m i n i m u m annua l r e n t a l , -ha l l be c o m p u t e d on the basis o f the average m o n t h l y a m o u n t t he reo f 
a c e a i i n g d u r i n g the i m m e d i a t e l y p reced ing - i x t \ i (.()) m o n t h p e r i o d , excep t t ha t i f it become? neee--
.-ar\ to c o m p u t e -ueh ren ta l be to re -ueh a - i \ t y <(>(.)) m o n t h [ )e r iod has o c c u r r e d t h e n o n the ba- is 
o f the a w r a n e m o n t h l y a m o u n t t he reo i acc ru ing d u r i i c s u e h sho r te r p e r i o d . 
In (he event o i d e t a u l t . all o l the I e n a n t ' - f i x t u r e s , f u r n i t u r e , e q u i p m e n t , imp rovemen t . - , add i -
t ion . - , a l t e r a t i o n s , and o t h e r per.-uual p r o p e r l v . -hal l r e m a i n o n the subject p remises and in tha t 
even t , and c o n t i n u i n g d u r i n g the length o f -aid d e f a u l t , L a n d l o r d shal l h a \ e the r i gh t to take the 
e x e l u - i v e [ jo--es.- ion ot -ame and to u.-e -ame. ren t o r charge f ree , u n t i l all d e f a u l t s are cu red o r , at 
iL- o p t i o n , at auv t i m e d u r i n g the te rm (^\ t i n - I.ce.-e. to requ i re Tenan t to f o r t h w i t h r e m o v e .-ame. 
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g «Niy o t h e r p r o w - i o n - o f th is A r t i c l e , the L a n d l o r d agrees t h a t i f the de fau l t 
c o m p l a i n e d o f . o t h e r than tor the p a y m e n t n f m o n i e s , is o f such a na tu re t ha t the same cannot be 
r e c t i f i e d or cu red \s i t h i n the t h i i t \ (M)) I\J\ p e r i o d r e q u i r i n g such r e c t i f i c a t i o n or c u r i n g as spec i f ied 
in the w r i t t e n no t i ce r e l a t i ng t h e r e t o , t hen such de fau l t shal l be deemed to be r e c t i f i e d or cured i f 
the T e n a n t w i t h i n .-ueh p e r i o d o\y t h i r t y ( " U ) ) d a v - - l u l l have c o m m e n c e d the r e c t i f i c a t i o n ami c u r i n g 
t h e r e o f and -hal l c o n t i n u e the rea f te r w i t h al l due d i l igence to cause such r e c t i f i c a t i o n and cu r i ng 
and d o e - -», t o m p l e t e the -sUue w i t h the u-e o f -ueh d i l igence as a fo resa id . 
The remedies g i \ e n to tin* L a n d l o r d in t i n - \ r t i< le shal l be in a d d i t i o n and s u p p l e m e n t a l to al l 
o t h e r r ight.- or remed ies w h i c h the L a n d l o r d mav h a w u n d e r the laws then in f o r c e . 
T h e wa iver h v L a n d l o r d o f auv breach o f diw t e r m , covenan t o r c o n d i t i o n he re i n con ta i ned 
shal l n o t be d e e m e d to be a wa iver ot -ueh t e r m . • o w u a n t o r c o n d i t i o n or any subsequen t breach o f 
the same or auv o t h e r t e r m . eo\ enant o r c o n d i t i o n here in c o n t a i n e d . T h e subsequent acceptance o f 
rent h e r e u n d e r hv L a n d l o r d shal l not be deemed to be a wa ive r o f any p reced ing b r e a c h by Tenan t 
o f anv t e r m , covenan t o r c o n d i t i o n o f t i n - I.ea-e. o t h e r t han the fa i lu re o f T e n a n t to pay the pa r t i cu -
lar r en ta l ?u a c c e p t e d , regardless o f L a n d l o r d ' - k n o w l e d g e o f such p reced ing b reach at the t ime o f 
accep tance o f -ueh r e n t . No e o w n a n l . t e r m , or c o n d i t i o n o f th is Lease shal l he d e e m e d to have been 
w a i v e d bv L a n d l o r d , utiles.- -ueh w a i w r be in w r i t i n g hv L a n d l o r d . ^ 
Art ic le 21 
DHFU LTin LANDLOKf) 
I n the event L a n d l o r d -hal l neglect o r fa i l to p e r f o r m o r observe any o f the c o v e n a n t s , p r o v i -
s i o n - o r c o n d i t i o n s c o n t a i n e d in th is Lea.-e o n i t - par t to be p e r f o r m e d or obse rved w i t h i n t h i r t y 
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5-36-11 JUDICIAL CODE 
)n" in the third sentence; substituted "be in the last sentence, and made minor changes 
>ued immediately" in the third sentence for in phraseology and punctuation. 
lot be issued until the expiration of five 
tvs"; deleted "within which time the tenant Treble damages. 
any subtenant, or any mortgagee of the Plaintiffs failure to comply with the provi-
rm, or other party interested in its continu- sions of 78-36-8 converted his action for 
ice, may pay into court for the landlord the unlawful detainer into one at common law 
nount of the judgment and costs, and for ejectment and defeated his right under 
ereupon the judgment shall be satisfied, this section to treble damages. Pingree v. 
d the tenant shall be restored to his estate; Continental Group of Utah, Inc. (1976) 558 P 
it if payment as herein provided is not 2d 1317. 
ade within the five days, the judgment may 
enforced for its full amount and for the L*w Reviews. 
ssession of the premises" at the end of the Forfeiture Under Installment Land Con-
ird sentence, deleted "other" before "cases" tracts in Utah, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 803, 807. 
78-36-11. Time for appeal. 
ction applicable. Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P., in which to appeal from 
A party has ten days, as provided by this * judgment for unlawful detainer. Ute-Cal 
:tion, and not one month, as provided by Land Development v. Intermountain Stock 
Exchange (1981) 628 P 2d 1278. 
78-36-12. Exclusion of t enan t without judicial process prohibited — Aban-
>ned premises excepted. It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant 
om the tenant 's premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an 
rner or his agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased 
emises under section 78-36-12.6 (b) [78-36-12.6(2)] and retaking the premises and 
tempting to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the 
emises. 
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12, enacted by L. 
61, ch. 160, § 6. 
78-36-12.3. Definitions. (1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant 
om entering into the premises with intent to deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the 
me meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent from 
e premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after the due date, 
d there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence of the tenant 's per-
nal property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent from 
e premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the tenant 's pe/sonal 
operty has been removed from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable evi-
nce that the tenant is occupying the premises. 
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12.3, enacted by L. 
al, ch. 160, §7. 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and rerent ing by owner — 
ability of tenant — Personal property of tenant left on premises. In the event 
abandonment the owner may: 
(1) Retake the premises and at tempt to rent them at a fair rental value and 
e tenant who abandoned the premises shall be liable: 
(a) For the entire rent due for the remainder of the term; 
(b) For rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises at a 
fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value and the rent 
agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the 
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary to restore the rental unit 
to its condition when rented by the tenant less normal wear and tear. This subsec-
tion shall apply, if less than subsection (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not 
re-rent the premises. 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal property 
on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, 
store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage costs from the ten-
ant. The owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location 
of the personal property; however, if the property has been in storage for over 30 
days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner may 
sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any amount the tenant owes. Any 
money left over from the sale of the property shall be handled as specified in sec-
tion 78-44-11. Nothing contained in this act shall be in derogation of or alter the 
owner's rights under Chapter 3 of Title 38. 
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12.6, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 160, §8. 
CHAPTER 37 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
78-37-1. Form of action — J u d g m e n t — Special execut ion. 
Multiple parcels offered at single foreclo-
sure sale. 
A valid foreclosure sale results in the sat-
isfaction of a specific mortgage debt from the 
sale proceeds attributable to the encumbered 
property; where multiple parcels of realty 
are offered at a single foreclosure sale, the 
proceeds from each parcel are applied to sat-
isfy only the related mortgage debt. Bawden 
& Associates v. Smith (1982) 646 P 2d 711. 
Nature of action. 
Proceeding to foreclose upon a mortgage is 
an action in rem or quasi in rem. 1ST 
National Credit Corp. v. Von Hake (1981) 511 
FSupp 634. 
Necessity of exhausting security. 
Mortgagee is required to exhaust its secu-
rity by foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged 
property before it can reach the genera 
assets of the debtor by writ of attachment 
Bank of Ephraim v. Davis (1978) 581 P 2* 
1001. 
Pledge of personal property. 
The rights of a creditor secured by i 
pledge of personal property are governed b> 
the Uniform Commercial Code, not this sec-
tion. Kennedy v. Bank of Ephraim (1979) 59-
P 2d 881. 
Law Reviews. 
Equitable Considerations of Mortga^ 
Foreclosure and Redemption in Utah: A Neei 
for Remedial Legislation, 1976 Utah L. Re\ 
327. 
78-37-6. Right of redemption, e tc . 
Extension of time to redeem. 
A court sitting in equity has discretion to 
extend the time period of redemption. 
Mollerup v. Storage Systems Internationa 
(1977) 569 P 2d 1122. ^ 
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